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How to Incite Crime with Words: Clarifying
Brandenburg’s Incitement Test with Speech
Act Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1900s, the Supreme Court has grappled with how
to distinguish protected speech from speech that incites others to
lawless action. The Court set forth the current standard for
determining whether speech falls into the latter category in the 1969
case of Brandenburg v. Ohio. 1 There, the Court held that advocacy of
violence is protected unless it “is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.” 2
The Brandenburg test is the product of a rich history of judicial
debate. 3 Unfortunately, the test is still unclear in some respects. For
example, it is not clear how imminent the resulting unlawful conduct
must be to satisfy Brandenburg. The Court’s subsequent opinion in
Hess v. Indiana, 4 for example, suggested that imminent may mean
within a matter of moments or hours, though it did not expressly
provide any specific time frame. 5 This lack of guidance has led to
confusion among lower courts. For example, some courts require
immediacy, while at least one court has suggested that imminent
encompasses conduct as far out as five weeks in the future. 6 Many
scholars have already made significant headway in resolving this
1. 295 U.S. 444 (1969).
2. Id. at 447.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
5. Id. at 108–09 (finding that there was no imminent risk of lawless action when a
rioter apprehended by the police yelled that he and the other rioters would take to the streets
later); John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for an
Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 455 (2002) (“Under a likely
interpretation of Brandenburg, the ‘imminence requirement’ extends only to lawless action
that results immediately after the words are spoken.”); L.A. Powe, Jr., Brandenburg: Then and
Now, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 69, 78 (2011) (suggesting, based on the Court’s opinions in
Brandenburg and Hess, that “imminence is probably a matter of hours, or stretching, a
few days”).
6. See Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
655, 715 (2009).
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issue, suggesting that the word imminent be defined as a matter of
days. 7 Much has been said on this issue already, and this Comment
adopts the more relaxed definition of imminence without
further explanation. 8
Another aspect of the Brandenburg test that remains unclear, and
the one this Comment endeavors to clarify, is the requirement that
the speech be “directed to” inciting imminent lawless action. This
Comment contends that speech act theory, a linguistic philosophy
that was first made famous in J.L. Austin’s book How to Do Things
with Words, can help clarify what it means to direct speech to
inciting crime.
Part II of this Comment discusses three Federal Court of
Appeals cases where the courts had to determine whether particular
online postings were directed to inciting imminent lawless action. In
each case, the courts decided (in a more or less conclusory fashion)
that the speech in question was not directed to inciting imminent
crime. Part III of this Comment introduces speech act theory and
the concepts of illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect. It then
proposes that focusing on an utterance’s illocutionary force can help
courts identify what kinds of speech are directed to inciting lawless
action. Part IV then analyzes the evolution of the incitement
doctrine through the lens of speech act theory, pointing out that
early Supreme Court incitement cases tended to focus only on the
7. See, e.g., id. at 715–18; KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF
LANGUAGE 267 (1989).
8. It is also unclear how the imminence requirement would play out in the modern
world of communication. Brandenburg was decided two decades before the Internet came to
be. See Cronan, supra note 5, at 448. The Court could not have even imagined such a
communicative forum. Accordingly, the Internet and other forms of modern communication
such as cell phones present some serious issues for the imminence requirement. Few
communications online are truly imminent because posts are often read long after they are
posted. Some modern forms of communication, such as text messaging or online instant
messaging, are immediate. But when someone posts something to a blog or a website, there is
often a significant time delay between posting and reading. Id. at 428. In this context, a major
unanswered question is whether imminence is measured from the time the speaker posts the
inciting language or from the time the reader reads it. Id. at 455–56. If measured from the
time it is posted, the imminence requirement “does not work with the vast majority of Internet
communications, as words in cyberspace are usually ‘heard’ well after they are ‘spoken.’” Id. at
428. But if measured from the time posts are read, the imminence requirement could still work
in the context of online incitement cases. Id. at 455–56. At least one scholar has suggested that
the latter option is more viable. See id. This Comment adopts that conclusion but does not
endeavor to explore the issue at length.
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speech’s perlocutionary effect, and concluding that Brandenburg is
best read as requiring an inquiry into an utterance’s illocutionary
force and its perlocutionary effect. Part V returns to the cases
discussed in Part II to demonstrate how a court would go about
analyzing an utterance’s illocutionary force.

II. CASES ATTEMPTING TO APPLY BRANDENBURG’S “DIRECTED
TO” LANGUAGE

A. Antiabortion Radicals: Planned Parenthood of
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of
Life Activists
Beginning around 1993, antiabortion radicals distributed a series
of “wanted” posters containing the names, photographs, and
addresses of abortion providers. 9 The posters accused the doctors of
“crimes against humanity” and stated that they were “armed and
extremely dangerous to women and children.” 10 Between 1993 and
1994, three physicians were killed as a result of the posters. 11
In 1995, the antiabortionists uploaded approximately 200 more
physicians’ names to a website, again including their photographs
and addresses. 12 Some of the physicians’ names were crossed out,
others were in grey font, and the rest were in black font. The
following legend accompanied the files: “Black font (working);
Greyed-out Name (wounded); Strikethrough (fatality).” 13 In other
words, the website recorded murders and other violent attacks
against the abortion doctors. The names of the three doctors who
had been murdered from 1993 to 1994 were struck through. 14
Several physicians featured on the website, terrified for their lives,
brought suit. 15 The case was first heard by a three-judge panel on the

9. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2002).
10. Id. at 1062, 1064.
11. Id. at 1063–64.
12. Id. at 1065.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1066.
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Ninth Circuit. 16 There, the court looked to Brandenburg for
guidance. In the end, it concluded that the website contained
protected speech:
Political speech may not be punished just because it makes it more
likely that someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the
future by an unrelated third party. In [Brandenburg], the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment protects speech that
encourages others to commit violence, unless the speech is capable
of “producing imminent lawless action.” . . . If the First
Amendment protects speech advocating violence, then it must also
protect speech that does not advocate violence but still makes it
more likely. 17

Because the suggested attacks on the physicians were not given a
definite time frame, the court concluded that they were not
imminent. More notably, the court suggested that the website was
not actually directed at producing violence at all. Rather, it simply
made violent attacks more likely.
The decision was eventually reversed in en banc review. 18 The
court agreed that the speech was protected under Brandenburg
(focusing mainly on the imminence requirement), but it found
another avenue by which to declare it unprotected: “[W]hile
advocating violence is protected, threatening a person with violence
is not.” 19 The Court analyzed the case under the true threats
doctrine and concluded that the files were designed to make the
physicians fear. Because so many physicians featured in “wanted”
posters had already been killed or injured, “no one putting [these
physicians] on a ‘wanted’-type poster . . . could possibly believe
anything other than that each would be seriously worried about
being next in line to be shot and killed.” 20

16. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
17. Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).
18. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1058.
19. Id. at 1072.
20. Id. at 1086.
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B. Animal Rights Activists: United States v. Fullmer

In United States v. Fullmer, a group of animal rights activists
engaged in protests against Huntingdon Life Sciences, a company
that provided animal testing services for clients bringing new
products to the market. 21 The group operated a website where it
posted stories of successful protests. Some of the protests were legal,
others were not. 22 One such post relayed a protest from an
anonymous source:
Late last night, August 30th, we paid a visit to the home of Rodney
Armstead, MD and took out two of his front windows . . . gave
him something to labor over this Labor Day weekend. Rodney
serves as an officer and agent of service for “Medical Diagnostic
Management, Inc.,” a scummy little company [associated with
Huntingdon]. Any ties with [Huntingdon] or its executives will
yield only headaches and a mess to clean up. 23

This post also included Dr. Armstead’s address and the
comment: “[We are] excited to see such an upswing in action against
Huntingdon and their cohorts. From the unsolicited direct action to
the phone calls, e-mails, faxes and protests. Keep up the
good work!” 24
Several posts on the website similarly targeted specific
Huntingdon employees. These typically contained the word
“Target: . . .” followed by an employee’s name, address, and a brief
description of her connection to Huntingdon. 25 Some of these posts
also contained information about targets’ children and where they
went to school. 26 These posts often resulted in the targets being
violently harassed or threatened either in person or over the phone. 27
The website was careful to state that such direct action was
“unsolicited,” and contained several disclaimers, such as: “We
operate within the boundaries of the law, but recognize and support

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

584 F.3d 132, 137–38 (2009).
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 142–46.
Id.
Id.
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those who choose to operate outside the confines of the
legal system.” 28
The website also featured an article entitled “Top 20 Terror
Tactics.” The article outlined different ways of terrorizing or
harassing others, including physically assaulting victims, smashing the
windows of their homes, and firebombing their cars. The list was
prefaced by the website’s standard disclaimer that it was not
soliciting criminal activity but concluded by saying, “Now don’t go
getting any funny ideas!” 29
Applying Brandenburg, the court concluded that
merely posting information on unlawful acts that have already
occurred, in the past, does not incite future, imminent unlawful
conduct. Moreover, the publication of the “Top Twenty Terror
Tactics,” without more, is also protected, because although it lists
illegal conduct, there is no suggestion that [the protesters] planned
to imminently implement these tactics. 30

Similar to the decision in Planned Parenthood, however, the
court decided that posting the employees’ addresses and personal
information constituted a true threat. 31 The reason, again, was
because the speakers “used past incidents to instill fear in
future targets.” 32
C. An Angry Blogger: United States v. Turner
In 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit issued a decision upholding a city handgun ban against a
Second Amendment challenge. 33 That same day, Turner, a white
supremacist with a shortwave-radio talk show, made a blog post
expressing his outrage at the decision. 34 He stated:

28. Id. at 139.
29. Id. at 140.
30. Id. at 155. The court did find that some of the group’s other activities, such as
organizing “electronic civil disobedience,” did constitute incitement. Id.
31. Id. at 156.
32. Id.
33. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub
nom. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
34. United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 414 (2013).
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All the years of peaceful legal challenges; all the years of peaceful
appeals; all the years of peacefully and lawfully lobbying federal and
state legislators, to achieve the penultimate goal of finally
interpreting the meaning of the Second Amendment, only to have
it all thrown in the trash by three Appellate Judges in a manner so
sleazy and cunning as to deserve the ultimate response.
...
Let me be the first to say this plainly: These Judges deserve to be
killed. Their blood will replenish the tree of liberty. A small price to
pay to assure freedom for millions. 35

The post then referred to the 2005 murder of Judge Joan
Lefkow’s mother and husband and attributed the murders to her
ruling in a case involving a white supremacist organization. 36 After
the decision, Turner had publicly stated that she was “worthy of
death,” and Turner interpreted the subsequent attacks as evidence of
his influence. 37
Turner continued to update the blog with harsh criticisms of
Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and William Bauer (the judges
who decided the Seventh Circuit case). 38 He posted their
photographs, their work addresses, the room numbers for their
chambers, and a map of the courthouse including the locations of
anti-truck-bomb barriers. 39 Turner also posted statements such as: “I
intend to incite revenge. . . . Vicious, brutal, savage revenge with
malice aforethought.” 40 There was no subtlety in Turner’s words. He
made his intentions clear:
While I can’t legally undertake killing, I may—just MAY—be able
to say enough of the right things, to enough of the right people, to
make it happen: People who have lost everything on account of
you. People whose children have lost everything on account of
you. People with nothing to lose by hunting you down and
murdering you. I am going to be pounding them with information
about you day and night. On and on, week after week after week.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 415–16.
Id.
Id. at 416.
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Sooner or later, some of them are gonna snap and you will
get dead. 41

Naturally, the judges found these posts alarming and brought
suit. The court concluded that the statements constituted true
threats. 42 When Turner suggested that this really should be an
incitement case because he himself did not intend to carry out the
murders, the court concluded: “Turner’s conduct was reasonably
found by the jury to constitute a threat, unprotected by the First
Amendment; it need not also constitute incitement to imminent
lawless action to be properly proscribed.” 43
Both the dissenting opinion and the opinion below argued that
Turner’s actions were not threats, but were directed to inciting
imminent lawless action. 44 They concluded that posting the names,
photographs, and locations of the judges, together with the
information about the anti-truck-bomb barriers, demonstrated that
Turner’s blog posts were aimed at encouraging others to kill or
seriously injure the judges. 45 The dissenting opinion, however, would
have overturned the district court’s ruling on other grounds. 46
D. Incitement or Truth Threats?
Each of the above cases presents the question of whether the
speech at issue was “directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action.” In Planned Parenthood, the three-judge panel
concluded that posting abortion doctors’ home addresses and
crossing off the names of those killed was not advocacy of illegal
action. In en banc review, the court dodged the question by turning
to the true threats doctrine. The court in Fullmer similarly
concluded that posting the employees’ addresses, past instances of
violent protests, and the “Top Twenty Terror Tactics” was not
directed to inciting future, imminent lawless action. In Turner, the
court avoided the question completely by turning to the true threats

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

1094

Id. at 417.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. at 434–35 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 435–36.
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doctrine. 47 Ultimately, all three cases were decided under the true
threats doctrine rather than the incitement doctrine.
This Comment does not endeavor to explore at length whether
it was proper to analyze these cases under the true threats doctrine.
It only notes that analyzing these cases under the true threats
doctrine required some mental gymnastics. The Supreme Court has
held that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.” 48 In the above cases, however, the speaker was
not really communicating an “intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence.” It is difficult to escape the fact that the speakers wanted
third parties to carry out violent crimes. 49 As the dissent in Turner
suggests, these cases likely fit better in the incitement context. The
question that remains is whether the courts correctly decided that
the speech in each case was not directed to inciting imminent
lawless action.
III. THE PROPOSED TEST
A. An Introduction to Speech Act Theory
Speech act theory was developed largely by the work of linguistic
philosophers J.L. Austin and John R. Searle. 50 Austin’s book How to
Do Things with Words first introduced the concept of speech act
theory, which analyzes the ways in which people use language.
Searle, one of Austin’s students, further developed the concept in
later years.

47. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 147, 163 (2011) (“Turner, of course, was not prosecuted for incitement but for making a
threat to a federal judge. Given the problem of proving the imminence necessary for
incitement, it is understandable why the prosecutor chose this path . . . .”).
48. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
49. Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line
Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 67 (2002) (noting that in cases such as these, the speakers “create fear
by increasing the likelihood of ensuing violence without actually threatening to carry out the
violence themselves”).
50. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE,
SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969); see also Peter Meijes
Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 303, 305 (1987).
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Both Austin and Searle asserted that every utterance has an
illocutionary force. 51 “The illocutionary force of an utterance reflects
a speaker’s intent and is often expressed by verbs such as order, warn,
assert, question, offer, and promise.” 52 Put simply, when people say
something, they do something. When a speaker says “the sky is
blue,” she is asserting a fact. When she says “pass the salt,” she is
ordering or requesting that someone do something. When she says
“what is your name?,” she is asking a question.
The illocutionary force is typically not expressly stated (such as
by saying “I assert that the sky is blue” or “I request that you pass
the salt”) but is gathered from the circumstances and the speaker’s
intonation. 53 Thus, the same words can have a different illocutionary
force depending on the context in which they are uttered. For
example, the sentence “You are coming over tomorrow” could be an
assertion if stated with ordinary intonation. It could also be a
question if the speaker’s intonation so indicated or even a command
if said sternly. 54
Austin claimed that there were more than a thousand
illocutionary verbs in the English language. 55 Searle later categorized
these verbs into five categories:
In the illocutionary line of business there are five and only five
basic things we can do with propositions: We tell people how
things are (assertives), We try to get them to do things (directives),
We commit ourselves to doing things (commissives), We express
our feelings and attitudes (expressives), and We bring about
changes in the world so that the world matches the proposition just
in virtue of the utterance (declarations). 56

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

SEARLE, supra note 50, at 23.
Tiersma, supra note 50, at 305.
Id.
See id.
SEARLE, supra note 50, at 23.
John R. Searle, Epilogue to the Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in CULTURAL
COMMUNICATION AND INTERCULTURAL CONTACT 409, 410 (Donald Carbaugh ed., 1990);
John R. Searle, A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 5 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 1, 11–16 (1976).
But see KENT BACH & ROBERT M. HARNISH, LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION AND SPEECH
ACTS 41 (1979) (categorizing illocutionary acts into only four categories: constatives,
directives, commissives, and acknowledgments). This Comment does not attempt to defend
one taxonomy over another. Although this Comment utilizes Searle’s taxonomy, the same
propositions could be established utilizing a different taxonomy.
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Although various verbs fall within each of these five categories, they
only describe various manners of asserting, directing, committing,
expressing, or declaring.
Utterances also have what speech act theory calls perlocutionary
effects or perlocutionary acts. 57 Searle explained perlocutionary
effects as follows:
Correlated with the notion of illocutionary acts is the notion of the
consequences or effects such acts have on the actions, thoughts, or
beliefs, etc. of hearers. For example, by arguing I may persuade or
convince someone, by warning him I may scare or alarm him, by
making a request I may get him to do something, by informing him I
may convince him. 58

As seen from Searle’s examples, there is generally a causal
relationship
between
the
illocutionary
force
and
the
perlocutionary effect. 59
B. The Test
This Comment proposes that courts should focus on an
utterance’s illocutionary force when deciding whether speech is
directed to producing crime. If the utterance has a directive
illocutionary force encouraging or urging imminent lawless action, it
is directed to producing such action. If it falls within one of the
remaining four categories of illocutionary forces (assertives,
commissives, expressives, or declarations), it is not.
In the easiest cases, the speaker will say something to the effect
of “I urge you to do X lawless action.” Other directive verbs that
would also have the same or similar illocutionary force would include
counsel, advise, request, ask, exhort, etc. Usually, however, the
utterance will not expressly include the verb indicating the
illocutionary force. One way to assure that the speech really does
directly advocate lawless action is to ask whether the statement can
fairly be rephrased using such a verb. 60 For example, “kill the
President” can fairly be rephrased “I urge you to kill the President.”
57. SEARLE, supra note 50, at 25; see also Tiersma, supra note 50, at 305.
58. SEARLE, supra note 50, at 25.
59. Tiersma, supra note 50, at 305.
60. See id. at 315 (“The essential question is whether an utterance is expressible with an
explicit performative phrase (‘I accuse’) or its semantic equivalent.”).
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Harder cases arise when the illocutionary force is not as clear.
Often, an utterance can have more than one illocutionary force. For
example, the statement “You are standing on my foot” has an
assertive illocutionary force. Its plain meaning simply asserts the fact
that the hearer is standing on the speaker’s foot. But this statement
generally has an inferred directive illocutionary force as well—”Get
off my foot.” 61 In this example, the inferred directive illocutionary
force is called an indirect speech act. Searle summarized indirect
speech acts as follows: “In indirect speech acts the speaker
communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of
relying on their mutually shared background information, both
linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of
rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.” 62 Thus, analyzing
indirect incitement requires the court to objectively look at what
inferences the hearer would rationally make from the utterance. An
utterance has an indirect, directive illocutionary force if, given the
circumstances under which the speaker made the utterance, the
hearer would rationally infer from the words used that the speaker is
urging her to engage in lawless action.
IV. INCITEMENT FRAMEWORKS THROUGH THE LENS OF SPEECH
ACT THEORY
The following subsections explore the evolution of the
incitement doctrine, pointing out where courts have come close to
distinguishing protected speech from unprotected incitement based
on an utterance’s illocutionary force. It concludes with a summary of
scholar Kent Greenawalt’s work on encouragements to law violation,
which made significant headway in explaining, based on linguistic
philosophy, why speech that incites lawless action does not merit
complete First Amendment protection.

61. See John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 59, 60 (P. Cole
& J.L. Morgan eds., 1975).
62. Id. at 60–61.
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A. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten: An Early Attempt at Analyzing
an Utterance’s Illocutionary Force
Two years before the United States Supreme Court would hear
an incitement case, Judge Learned Hand, then a district court judge,
formulated an incitement test in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten. 63
The year was 1917, and the United States had just entered World
War I. Congress had passed the Espionage Act, which prohibited
anyone “from willfully causing insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States.” 64
Based on this Act, the postmaster of New York refused to accept and
deliver a revolutionary magazine called The Masses. 65 The publisher
sought a court order forcing the postmaster to deliver the magazine.
The particular magazine issues in question contained cartoons
and text expressing animosity to the draft and to the war. 66 For
example, one issue contained a poem dedicated as a tribute to two
prisoners convicted of obstructing the draft. 67 The magazine as a
whole clearly opposed the draft but did not expressly encourage or
direct anyone to resist it. 68 The postmaster defended his refusal to
circulate the magazine on the basis that the ideas expressed therein
“tend[ed] to promote a mutinous and insubordinate temper among
the troops.” 69 For Judge Hand, it was not enough that an idea
tended to promote insubordination:
[T]o interpret the word “cause” so broadly would . . . involve
necessarily as a consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism,
and of all opinion except what encouraged and supported the
existing policies, or which fell within the range of temperate
argument. It would contradict the normal assumption of
democratic government that the suppression of hostile criticism
does not turn upon the justice of its substance or the decency and
propriety of its temper. 70

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 544.
See id. at 543–44.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 539–40.
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To prevent the risk of suppressing dissenting viewpoints based solely
on the fact that they criticized the government, Judge Hand
suggested that such speech was protected unless it directly counseled
or advised others to violate the law. Under Judge Hand’s test,
deciding whether the speech directly urged law violation required
looking at the actual words uttered. Judge Hand explained:
To counsel or advise a man to an act is to urge upon him either
that it is his interest or his duty to do it. . . . If one stops short of
urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the
law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to
cause its violation.
. . . I have construed the [Espionage Act] as therefore limited to
the direct advocacy of resistance to the recruiting and enlistment
service. If so, the inquiry is narrowed to the question whether any
of the challenged matter may be said to advocate resistance to the
draft, taking the meaning of the words with the utmost latitude
which they can bear. 71

In other words, the question is whether the speaker (a) urged,
counseled, or directed someone to violate the law or instead (b)
expressed a viewpoint which could indirectly cause someone to
violate the law because of its content. If (a), then the speech is not
protected. If (b), it is. To use speech act theory terminology, Judge
Hand’s test focuses on the utterance’s illocutionary force. The
question is whether the speaker’s utterance (a) had a directive
illocutionary force counseling, advising, or urging law violation or
(b) had an assertive illocutionary force stating a set of affairs or an
expressive illocutionary force voicing dissatisfaction with a set
of affairs.
Applying this test, Judge Hand found that the magazine did not
“counsel or advise” others to violate the law. 72 Referring to the poem
giving tribute to two draft resisters, Judge Hand reasoned:
That such comments have a tendency to arouse emulation in others
is clear enough, but that they counsel others to follow these
examples is not so plain. . . . One may admire and approve the
course of a hero without feeling any duty to follow him. There is

71.
72.
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not the least implied intimation in these words that others are
under a duty to follow. The most that can be said is that, if others
do follow, they will get the same admiration and the same approval.
Now, there is surely an appreciable distance between esteem and
emulation; and unless there is here some advocacy of such
emulation, I cannot see how the passages can be said to fall within
the law. 73

The other contested texts and cartoons also amounted only to
“political agitation,” which Judge Hand found worthy
of protection. 74
Judge Hand’s test is similar to the test this Comment proposes.
The difference, however, is that Judge Hand was focused on the
literal language that the speaker used. 75 This led to two main
criticisms of his test. First, it failed to account for purposeful but
indirect incitement to crime. Judge Hand’s contemporaries often
pointed to Marc Antony’s oration over Caesar’s body in
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, where Marc Antony never directly
counseled his audience to attack Brutus but clearly intended to
impassion them to do so. 76 Under Judge Hand’s test, Mark Antony’s
oration would be protected despite the fact that the circumstances
indicated that he was seeking to produce violence. Second, the
Masses test may also sweep in speech that, taken literally, urges other
people to commit crime but that in context is figurative or mere
hyperbole. 77 For example, a person frustrated with a government
official may exclaim that someone should go shoot her. Even if it is
clear to the audience that the speaker is just letting off steam and not
seriously directing anyone to actually shoot the official, the Masses
test may find such speech unprotected.
This Comment’s proposed test would resolve these issues. Marc
Antony’s praises of Caesar would be considered encouragements to
73. Id.
74. Id. at 540–41. Judge Hand’s opinion was subsequently overturned and his test
abandoned, but Masses continues to be a focus of scholarly debate.
75. Id. at 542. Judge Hand acknowledged the possibility of indirect advocacy but never
addressed how far beyond the literal language the factfinder can look. Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 729 (1975).
76. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 28 (5th
ed. 2013); Gunther, supra note 75, at 729.
77. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 76, at 28–29.
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violent action because it was clear under the circumstances that he
was provoking the crowd to violence. His speech would constitute
an indirect speech act, the functional equivalent of expressly
directing the crowd to attack Brutus. Also, the frustrated
constituent’s hyperbolic language suggesting that someone kill a
government official would be protected under this Comment’s test.
Austin noted that when a speaker uses language figuratively or in
jest, the illocutionary force cannot be derived from the literal
words used. 78
B. Incitement, the Early Years: A Focus on Perlocutionary Effects
The Supreme Court’s first incitement case was Schenck v. United
States. 79 The relevant statute was again the Espionage Act. 80 Schenck
had mailed flyers to men who had accepted calls to military service. 81
The flyers stated that conscription violated the Thirteenth
Amendment and otherwise criticized the draft. 82 It encouraged the
draftees “not to submit to intimidation” and to assert their rights,
but confined itself to “peaceful measures such as a petition for the
repeal of the [draft].” 83
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, set forth the following
rule: “The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.” 84 Justice Holmes gave his
now-famous example of a man “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.” 85 He concluded that, given the nation’s state of
crisis, mailing the flyers would likely cause such proverbial panic in
the form of draft resistance. 86
Justice Holmes’s test, along with the fire-in-a-crowded-theater
example, illustrates the Court’s early focus on perlocutionary effects.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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As long as there was a clear and present danger of evil, the test was
satisfied. The utterance could have a directive, assertive, or expressive
illocutionary force and be unprotected as long as there was a clear
and present risk of a harmful perlocutionary effect. Although the
“clear and present” language suggested that the perlocutionary
effect would have to be immediate, its application in Schenck made it
clear that even remote and tentative dangers made the speech
unprotected. The contemporaneous opinions in Debs v. United
States 87 and Frohwerk v. United States 88 further clarified that speech
was unprotected as long as its “natural tendency and reasonably
probable effect” was to cause insubordination or disloyalty. 89
Later opinions saw Justice Holmes give some weight to his
example of shouting fire in a crowded theater. In Abrams v. United
States, he dissented from an opinion convicting several Russian
immigrants of violating the Espionage Act for distributing flyers
asking workers in ammunition factories to go on strike to prevent
weapons from getting to Russia. 90 “[W]e should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.” 91 This test still focused on the utterance’s perlocutionary
effect, but required an imminent risk of danger rather than the
attenuated risk in Schenk.
Decades of debate over the proper standard ensued. For
example, in the 1927 case of Whitney v. California, the majority
continued the tradition of Schenk’s natural-tendency test. 92 Justice

87. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
88. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
89. See Gunther, supra note 75, at 737–39 (noting that Holmes’s early incitement test
was more akin to a “bad tendency” test than a “clear and present danger” test); G. Edward
White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human
Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 414–15 (1992) (same).
90. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
91. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
92. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (“That the freedom of speech which is secured by the
Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one
may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of
language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that a State in
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Brandeis wrote a concurring opinion adopting Justice Holmes’s
imminence requirement: “[A] valid restriction does not exist unless
speech would produce . . . a clear and imminent danger of some
substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to
prevent.” 93 Though the majority’s and the dissent’s standards can
lead to vastly different results, both focused on an utterance’s
perlocutionary effect. Justices Brandeis and Holmes simply would
require more clarity that the speech produce an immediate
perlocutionary effect.
During the second Red Scare, a unique variation of previous
incitement tests emerged. In Dennis v. United Sates, the Court
affirmed the convictions of several Communist Party leaders
convicted of conspiring to “advocate and teach the duty and
necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the
United States by force and violence.” 94 The Court adopted the
following standard: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” 95 This
formula allowed the Court to take into consideration the seriousness
of the harm (or “evil”) being advocated. It also asked the Court to
consider how likely (not how imminent) it was that harm would
result. The focus, however, was still on the likelihood that the
utterance would result in a harmful perlocutionary effect. The
speech’s illocutionary force remained irrelevant.
This era of debate over the correct incitement standard
contributed greatly to the current test. The problem with these tests,
however, is that they only focus on the utterance’s perlocutionary
effect. Focusing only on the utterance’s perlocutionary effect is
unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. For example, Judge Hand
later stated that he chose not to focus on an utterance’s effects in his
Masses decision primarily because he (1) doubted judges’
competency to accurately predict an utterance’s likely consequences,
the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances
inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger
the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not
open to question.”).
93. Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
94. 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951).
95. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Daniels, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
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(2) similarly distrusted juries, and (3) found jury incompetency
particularly problematic during times of national crisis. 96 The first
two require little explanation—how can judges and juries presume to
know the consequences of an utterance? Judges and juries are not
oracles. They can only rely on their own experience and are likely to
be biased against speech they dislike. Predictions of future violence
could become a façade by which juries punish unpopular ideas. 97
Judge Hand especially distrusted judges and juries during times
of war. He seemed especially aware in Masses, which took place
during World War I, that fear could provide strong motives to
sanction unpopular ideas. 98 The right to criticize the government is a
fundamental part of free speech because it safeguards the public from
government deception and abuse of power. 99 But during national
crises, safeguards appear to be weak links and government criticizers
appear to be traitors. Concerned that such would be the case, Judge
Hand avoided tests that would require judges and juries to predict
the likely consequences of speech.
If the goal is to distinguish speech that merely advocates ideas
from speech that advocates criminal action, a test that focuses only
on an utterance’s perlocutionary effect is unsatisfactory. Under the
Court’s early tests, it would not matter whether the speaker
advocated an idea or an action as long as there was a danger of harm.
96. See Gunther, supra note 75, at 725 (“To second-guess enforcement officials about
probable consequences of subversive speech was to [Judge Hand] a questionable judicial
function: judges had no special competence to foresee the future. Moreover, even if
predictions about the consequences of words were thought to be appropriate court business,
the task would ordinarily fall not to the judge but to the jury, a body reflecting majoritarian
sentiments unlikely to be conducive to the protection of dissent in wartime.”). Judge Hand
articulated these criticisms in letters to Justice Holmes written during the period when the
Supreme Court was hearing early incitement cases such as Schenk and Abrams. Id. at 719–22.
During the correspondence, Judge Hand tried, without success, to convince Justice Holmes to
adopt the standard set forth in Masses. Id. at 736.
97. See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246
F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
98. Id. at 540 (“[T]o assimilate [political] agitation, legitimate as such, with direct
incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political
agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not a
scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom.”).
99. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 76, at 7 (“[F]ree speech prevents
government abuse of power.”); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977) (arguing that the First Amendment plays an
important role in checking the government).
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Adding an imminence requirement was a step in the right direction,
but it still failed to adequately distinguish protected advocacy of
ideas from unprotected advocacy of lawless action.
C. Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Blend of Illocutionary Force and
Perlocutionary Effect
After many years of development, the Court announced the
current incitement test in 1969. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the leader
of a Ku Klux Klan group was convicted of violating Ohio’s Criminal
Syndicalism Statute, which made it illegal to “advocat[e] . . . the
duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform.” 100 At a Ku Klux Klan rally, the leader gave a speech,
saying in relevant part: “We’re not a revengent organization, but if
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might
have to be some revengeance taken.” 101
The Court found that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional:
[As we have stated], ‘the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence,
is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling
it to such action.’ A statute which fails to draw this distinction
impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation
speech which our Constitution has immunized from
governmental control. 102

The Court then set forth the following incitement standard,
which would prove to last longer than any of its previously
articulated tests:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting

100.
101.
102.
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or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. 103

Thus, the test holds that speech constitutes incitement only when
speakers direct their speech at creating imminent lawless action and it
is likely that such imminent lawless action will result. Various relics
from former tests appear in this formulation. For example, scholar
Gerald Gunther observed that the “directed to” language comes
from Judge Hand’s opinion in Masses, and that the imminence
requirement is the product of Justice Holmes’s early contributions to
the case law. 104
The Brandenburg test should be read as requiring an inquiry into
an utterance’s illocutionary force and its perlocutionary effect. The
“directed to” language suggests that speech constitutes unprotected
incitement only if it is aimed at getting others to violate the law as
opposed to simply expressing or asserting an idea. This requirement
is best understood as requiring that the speech have a directive
illocutionary force, as explained more fully in Part III. The
remaining elements of the test focus on the utterance’s
perlocutionary effect and set forth important narrowing principles.
Once it is established that the speech was directed to inciting lawless
action, the imminence requirement limits the test to encompass only
incitement to crimes to be committed within a short period of time.
The remaining requirement adds an additional constraint that the
perlocutionary effect be likely. 105
D. Kent Greenawalt on Encouragements to Crime
Scholar Kent Greenawalt also borrowed from linguistic
philosophy in his scholarship on incitement. 106 Greenawalt contrasted
encouragements and requests to commit crime with assertions of fact
103. Id.
104. See Gunther, supra note 75, at 754–55.
105. The Court has not addressed what the “likely” requirement means. See Healy, supra
note 6, at 713. For scholarly discussion of what “likely” should mean, see id. at 713–15
(suggesting that the “probable cause” standard from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would
be an adequate standard); GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 267–68 (suggesting that the
likelihood requirement should be flexible, requiring a greater probability for less
serious crimes).
106. Greenawalt, however, focused more on Austin’s early work discussing performative
utterances. GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 58.
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and value. Statements that assert facts or values, Greenawalt argued,
fall squarely within First Amendment protection. 107 Assertions of fact
such as, “Rapid inflation causes social instability” and assertions of
value such as, “Love is the greatest good” contribute to society’s
overall quest for information and help inform public decisionmaking. 108 In contrast, “[t]he purpose of [an encouragement or
request] is not to convey some truth, but to get something done.” 109
Accordingly, Greenawalt concluded that encouragements and
requests to commit crime merit less First Amendment protection. 110
But Greenawalt also noted that assertions of fact and value and
encouragements to crime are often intertwined. 111 For example, a
person expressing her intense opposition to the draft may
communicate her ideas and, to illuminate the practical implications
of her belief, suggest that listeners resist the draft. 112 This tricky
interplay led Greenawalt to conclude that “[b]ecause requests and
encouragements are designed to induce action and because much of
what they impliedly communicate about facts and values could be
otherwise communicated, they lie at the margin of a principle of free
speech, but such a principle cannot disregard them altogether.” 113
Greenawalt suggested that the Brandenburg test, with a few
clarifications, would be an adequate way to distinguish protected
assertions of fact and value from encouragements and requests to
commit crime. 114
Greenawalt’s distinction between assertions of fact and value and
encouragements to commit crime is essentially the same as this
Comment’s distinction based on a statement’s illocutionary force.
Greenawalt even appreciated that there are both direct and indirect

107. Id. at 43–45.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 69.
110. Id. at 70.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 70–71.
114. Id. at 266–67. For example, Greenawalt wished to clarify that for less serious crimes
such as tax evasion, the appropriate remedy would be to punish the actor, not the encourager.
Id. at 269. Greenawalt also suggested that the test should be limited to instances where the
speaker advocates committing specific crimes, as opposed to advocating crime generally. Id. at
266. As discussed in Part I, Greenawalt also favored a more relaxed imminence requirement.
Id. at 267.
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ways of encouraging crime, and that often it is difficult to know
whether someone is actually encouraging crime or simply expressing
an idea. 115 This Comment’s proposed test builds on and further
develops Greenawalt’s distinction to clarify how courts can
distinguish encouragements to crime from assertions of fact and
value. Focusing on the utterance’s illocutionary force provides a way
to objectively analyze whether an utterance encourages law violation
or merely asserts an idea.
V. APPLYING THE TEST
This section applies the test proposed in Part III to the cases
discussed in Part II. To decide whether speech is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action, courts should focus on the
speech’s illocutionary force. If the utterance has a directive
illocutionary force urging lawless action, it satisfies the “directed to”
requirement of the Brandenburg test. Sometimes it will be apparent
that the speech has a directive illocutionary force, such as if the
speaker says “I urge you to kill Bob.” Other times, the illocutionary
force will be indirect. In those cases, courts should consider whether
the audience, under the circumstances, would rationally infer that
the speaker is urging lawless action.
For the sake of argument, this Comment assumes that
Brandenburg’s “imminence” and “likely” requirements are met in
the three cases. In each case, the audience had all of the necessary
information to carry out violent crimes. It is reasonable to infer that
someone equipped with the names and addresses of the abortion
doctors, Huntingdon employees, or judges would be capable of
carrying out violent attacks within a matter of days. Furthermore,
the speakers in each case had previously engaged in similar speech
that resulted in violent attacks: the antiabortion activists’ “wanted”
posters had successfully elicited crime in the past, the animal rights
activists’ blog had previously resulted in violent attacks against
Huntingdon employees, and Turner had previously made a

115. Id. at 110–12, 118–26 (“Often words are ambiguous, leaving doubt whether the
speaker actually urges the commission of criminal acts. When the words are plain on their face,
it may still be unclear whether they are intended literally or to make some rhetorical point. . . .
Unless the net of criminal liability is cast carefully, persons may be held responsible for
communications not actually intended by them to cause criminal behavior.”).
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statement about a judge that resulted in a violent attack. 116 Given this
history, it seems likely that violent conduct would result. These
conclusions may, of course, be subject to debate, but this Comment
takes them as given and only addresses whether the speech in
question was directed at inciting such imminent lawless action.
A. Planned Parenthood
In Planned Parenthood, the three-judge panel concluded that
posting the names, photographs, and addresses of abortion doctors
to a website did not advocate violence against them, even though it
perhaps made violent attacks more likely. To be sure, nothing about
the website expressly encouraged readers to use that information to
carry out violent attacks. It is possible that the website provided the
information to facilitate non-violent protests against the abortion
doctors, such as writing letters or picketing outside of the doctors’
offices. In fact, some of the “wanted” posters simply offered a
reward to those who could persuade the doctors to stop
performing abortions. 117
The legend indicating which of the abortion doctors had been
killed or wounded, on its own, also did not expressly encourage
people to attack the abortion doctors. Crossing out the names of
doctors that had been killed had an assertive illocutionary force. In
effect, the website functioned as a report, stating the fact that “the
following doctors have already been killed or seriously wounded.” Of
course, reporting and apparently approving of violent crime that has
already occurred may result in emulation. But unless the website
actually encouraged emulation, it cannot conclusively be said to have
been directed at producing future violent attacks. 118

116. See supra Section II.C. The extent of Turner’s actual influence in the previous
attack against Judge Lefkow’s family is unclear, but Turner suggested that he played a role in
eliciting that crime. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
117. See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2002).
118. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Whether or not an audience will emulate
conduct reported by the speaker goes to the statement’s perlocutionary effect. The relevant
question for determining an utterance’s illocutionary force is whether the speaker, directly or
indirectly, encouraged such emulation. The mere fact that one reports criminal conduct does
not necessarily establish that she is encouraging others to follow suit.
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Neither the information provided about the abortion doctors
nor the report on which doctors had already been attacked contained
a directive illocutionary force standing alone. But combined, a court
could reasonably find that they constituted an indirect speech act
urging readers to violence against the abortion doctors. The legend
indicated that names that were struck through had been killed,
names that were in grey had been wounded, and names in black
were yet to be attacked. 119 In effect, the website said, “This is what
has been done, and this is what is left to do.” Providing the names
and addresses of the doctors yet to be attacked or killed would
rationally lead readers, especially those sympathetic to the
organization’s cause and methods, to infer that the website
encouraged them to participate in carrying out the remaining
attacks. Thus, although the website did not directly urge law
violation, the circumstances suggested that people would infer that
the website was both urging and facilitating murders or other violent
protests. Notably, Planned Parenthood is likely the closest call of the
three cases discussed in this Comment, and it would not be
unreasonable for a court to find that the website fell shy of inciting
crime if it felt these inferences were too weak.
B. Fullmer
Similar to the court in Planned Parenthood, the court in Fullmer
found that the act of simply reporting previous attacks against
Huntingdon employees was not directed at imminently inciting
future attacks. Certainly, reporting past attacks, without more, is
merely an assertion of fact. But the website did more than simply
report. After reporting the violent attack against Dr. Armstrong, the
website stated, “[We are] excited to see such an upswing in action
against Huntingdon and their cohorts. From the unsolicited direct
action to the phone calls, e-mails, faxes, and protests. Keep up the
good work!” 120 The phrase “Keep up the good work” has a directive
illocutionary force encouraging readers to carry out similar violent
attacks as well as non-violent attacks. It is of no moment that the
website went to great lengths to specify that illegal protests were

119.
120.

Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065.
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 140 (3rd Cir. 2009).
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unsolicited. Indeed, the website contradicted itself in stating that it
was excited to see “unsolicited direct action” and then continuing to
encourage people to “[k]eep up the good work.”
Aside from this express encouragement to commit violent
attacks, the website also indirectly urged lawless action. The “Top
Twenty Terror Tactics” article alone did not necessarily encourage
people to carry out those tactics. But after the article, the website
stated, “Now don’t go getting any funny ideas!” 121 In context, this
sarcastic comment would lead readers to infer that the speaker was
encouraging them to utilize the violent tactics in their protests
against Huntingdon employees. It therefore has an indirect, directive
illocutionary force urging lawless action.
Additionally, the website provided readers with the names and
addresses of certain employees as well as information about their
children. As in Planned Parenthood, it is possible that the website
simply provided this information to facilitate non-violent protests.
But, together with reports on past violent attacks and the “Top
Twenty Terror Tactics” article, readers would infer that the
information was intended to be used to carry out both violent and
non-violent protests. Furthermore, the website would have no
reason to include information about the employees’ families and
children if it were simply encouraging non-violent protests.
Including the information about the employees’ family members
strongly suggests that the information was meant to be used to
terrorize and not just to peacefully protest.
C. Turner
Turner’s statements similarly had directive illocutionary forces.
Stating that the judges “deserve to be killed” 122 has an assertive
illocutionary force that, at first blush, merely asserts an idea.
Statements like this are often hyperbole or rhetoric used to express
extreme outrage. In this sense, they also may have an expressive
illocutionary force. Read in context, however, the reader would
rationally infer that Turner was urging third parties to kill the judges.
Statements such as “I intend to incite revenge” or stating that he

121.
122.
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Id. at 140.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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may “be able to say enough of the right things” to get the judges
killed suggest that Turner not only thought the judges deserved to
be killed but that he was also encouraging others to kill them.
Where Turner really crossed the line was posting the judges’
names, work addresses, and a map of the courthouse pointing out
the anti-truck-bomb barriers. 123 There was no direct counseling—
each of these statements only assert facts. But as the dissenting
opinion suggested, it would be reasonable to infer that Turner was
urging readers to utilize that information to “take revenge” on the
judges. It is difficult to see what other purpose he could have had in
providing the judges’ work location and the information about antitruck-bomb barriers. Perhaps, as the majority opinion suggested, he
was simply trying to instill fear in the judges. But the attention to
detail and the accompanying encouragements undermine such an
analysis. As a whole, the website conveyed an indirect illocutionary
force urging the audience to kill the judges.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts and scholars have been trying for nearly a century to
adequately distinguish protected advocacy of ideas from unprotected
advocacy of lawless action. The Brandenburg test is the product of
decades of development and, overall, provides a satisfactory test for
making the distinction. Under Brandenburg, advocacy of lawless
action is protected unless it “is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.” 124 But Brandenburg leaves several questions unanswered.
Much has been said about what Brandenburg’s imminence
requirement should mean, but still unanswered is the equally
important question of what it means to direct speech at producing
imminent lawless action.
Speech act theory has already explained how to decide what
kinds of speech encourage others to actions and what kinds of speech
merely assert ideas. The distinction between protected speech and
unprotected encouragement to crime can best be made by focusing
on the utterance’s illocutionary force. Adopting this test would

123.
124.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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provide more clarity among courts and enable them to deal with
hard cases where the speaker does not expressly encourage crime,
but does so indirectly.
Bradley J. Pew*

* J.D. candidate, April 2016, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I would
like to thank Professor RonNell Andersen Jones for her guidance in writing this Comment. I
would also like to thank Janet Lawrence, Victoria Chen, and the BYU Law Review staff for
their work in editing this Comment.
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